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LIBEL PER SE IN NEW YORK-O'CONNELL REVISITED
Since the case of O'Connell v. Press Publishing Co.,' New York cases
have gone divergent ways to determine when a libelous statement should be
actionable in the absence of an allegation of special damages. So inconsistent
have been the cases2 in their adherence to and their departure from the
so-called O'Connell rule that whatever validity this rule may once have
enjoyed, the principle generally thought to be the rule of the case is now,
if still technically the law of libel in New York, thoroughly devitalized.?
TrDITIONAL ViEws ON LIBEL PER SE

O'Connell explained that libel per se exists where "the language as a
whole, considered in its ordinary meaning, naturally and proximately was
so injurious to the plaintiff that the court will presume, without any proof,
that his reputation or credit has been thereby impaired."" It is significant
that libel per se vas not defined in O'Conncll with reference to allegations in
the complaint of extrinsic facts (inducement), of the defamatory meaning of
the statement (innuendo), or of the fact that the statement was made
concerning the plaintiff (colloquium).P The uncertainty cast upon the law
by O'Co;znell arises solely from the following dictum:
The appellant then invokes the established rules of laiw that .

..

a publisher of a

libel not defamatory upon its face, and defamatory by virtue of extrinsic facts is
liable only for the pecuniary damage which legally resulted from the publication ....
[T]he facts showing such damage must be fully and specifically set forth in the complaint.6

The offending words in this dictum are "established rules of law".' They
presuppose to be law what in New York had never previously been held to
be the law. The cases cited in the opinion in support of the proposition that
1.
2.

214 NY. 352, ICS N.E. 556 (1915).
See Comment, 27 Fordham L. Rev. 405 (1953).

3. "The third cause [of action] contains extrinsic matter explaining the quoted dematter.. . . This case [O'Connell] is not generally followed." Newman v. Ad

famatory

Reinhardt, 133 N.Y.L.J., June 23, 1955, p. 3, cols. 6-7 (unreported opinion of Sup. Ct,
Nathan, J.), aff'd mem., 3 App. Div. 2d 909, 163 N.YS.2d 403 (let Dcp't 1957);

"[AlIthough the Court of Appeals has not overruled the rule erroneously declared, it has
not followed it. It has been followed in the lower courts by some justices and apparently
disregarded by others .... " Selman, Libel and Slander in the State of New Yorl; C43, at
51 (1933).
4. 214 N.Y. at 358, 103 N.E. at 557.
5. See notes 22-25 infra and accompanying text.
6. 214 N.Y. at 35S, 10S N.E. at 557. (Emphasis added.)
7. "Whatever may have been the merits of the case, long since decided, the etatement
in the opinion... [that allegations of extrinsic facts require allegations of sEpzdal damages]
There was no authority in the state that if
was without foundation in fact or law ....
the plaintiff did plead extrinsic facts whereby the words became actionable, that he must
plead special damage or fail in his action." Seelman, Libd and Slander in the State of
New York § 46, at 51 (1933).
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extrinsic facts require special damages do not support that proposition.8
There have been three traditional views on the law of libel per se: first,
all libel is actionable even in the absence of allegations of special damages
in the complaint; 9 second, when the defamation is established only with the
aid of an allegation of extrinsic facts, of the defamatory meaning of the publication, or of the fact that the statement was made concerning plaintiff-i.e.,
where the publication is not defamatory on its face, but defamatory per
quod-an allegation of special damages is required to make the statement
actionable; 10 third, when the defamation is established only with the aid of
one of the three elements of libel per quod, but falls within one of the four
categories" of slander which are actionable per se, the defamation is actionable
even in the absence of special damages. 12 There is substantial authority",
which would place New York within the second view, requiring special
damages in all cases of libel per quod, solely by virtue of the O'Connell
dictum.
WHY SPECIAL DAMAGES WERE REQUIRED IN O'CONNELL

The facts in O'Connell establish that the holding there was much narrower
than the rule that libel by extrinsic facts requires special damages.
Plaintiff O'Connell had been a government witness before a federal grand
jury. He had testified to being the inventor of a "corset spring" and to
having been interviewed by one of the defendants, who was subsequently
indicted by the grand jury for the fraudulent weighing and selling of sugar.
Press Publishing Company, the defendant, had published an account of the
federal indictment together with the testimony which O'Connell had given.
Plaintiff's theory was that solely, by way of innuendo, the publication could
reasonably be understood to mean that plaintiff was in some way implicated
in the crime of the fraudulent weighing of sugar. Nowhere in the opinion
does it appear that extrinsic facts were even alleged in the complaint. The
court did not recognize inducement as determinative of the case, but specifically excluded the relevancy of extrinsic facts altogether, stating that "the
allegations of extrinsic facts do not enter into the discussion for the reason
that if the defamatory matter is actionable per se, no inducement or averment
8. Ibid.
9. Restatement, Torts § 569 (1938).
10. The O'Connell dictum regarding the necessity of special damages has been construed by subsequent cases to require special damages for all species of libel per quod.
11. The four categories of slander are imputations of: unchastity to a woman, affliction
with a loathsome disease, the commission of a crime, professional business incompetence
or malpractice.
12. Foley v. Hoffman, 188 Md. 273, 52 A.2d 476 (1947).
13. E.g., Seelman, Libel and Slander in the State of New York § 46, at 51 (1933). Only
two of the elements of libel per quod were referred to in the O'Connell opinion: inducenedt
and innuendo. The statement in regard to inducement was not determinative of the result.
The innuendo in the complaint was held, however, to require special damages. The case
did not hold that libel per quod universally requires allegations of special damages, though
it has frequently been cited for this proposition.
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of extrinsic facts is necessary."'14 The publication in this instance was found
not to be libelous per se solely because the innuendoes of the complaint
contravened the ordinary meaning of the publication:
The innuendoes of the complaint seek to give the language of the publication a
broader application, but improperly and ineffectually, because it is not the office of
the innuendo to graft a meaning upon or enlarge the matter set forth, but to explain
the application of the words usedY5
Thus O'Connell set out what might aptly be called the rule of ordinary
meaning.'1 The holding was cast not in terms of extrinsic facts, but wholly
in terms of a faulty innuendo. The innuendoes of the complaint were unwarranted because they sought to "graft a meaning" upon the ordinary
meaning. The "language as a whole, considered in its ordinary meaning"
was not defamatory of the plaintiff. This is far from holding that any
allegation of inducement, innuendo, or colloquium is fatal to the status
of libel per se. Special damages were essential in this case only because the
innuendo was improper, and only because it sought to give the language of
the publication "a broader application" than its ordinary meaning. Further,
O'Connell, in its own words, 17 was not concerned with extrinsic facts in
reaching the result it did. Consequently, anything which it had previously
said about extrinsic facts was merely dicta.' s
THE "ORDINARY

MEANING" RULE

It is implicit in the O'Connell holding that where the innuendo merely seeks
to explain the fair import of the statement, such innuendo does not require
special damages provided that the publication is otherwise libelous. Only
where the innuendo seeks to "graft a meaning" are special damages required.
Still less did O'Connell's holding make inducement a bar to libel per se.29
In a situation where the ordinary meaning is not readily apparent without the
use of innuendo, where the only function of the innuendo is to explain
the ordinary meaning and in so doing also expose a latent defamatory meaning,
such an innuendo should not require an allegation of special damages since
it would merely "explain the application of the words used." In the case
of a cryptic publication, 2' on whose face the ordinary meaning is not readily
apparent, the innuendo pleaded should not be fatal to libel per se.
It is impossible to reconcile the myriad of cases that have reached different
14.
15.

214 N.Y. at 360, 10S N.E. at 553.
Id. at 360, 1oS N.E. at 55S.

16. More precisely the rule is: all libel is actionable per se whose ordinary meaning is
defamatory. As will be seen, this rule embraces certain species of libel per quad and
excludes others.
17. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
18. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
19. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
20. 214 N.Y. at 360, 103 NXE. at 55S.
21. E.g., Lasky v. Kempton, 2S5 App. Div. 1121, 140 N.Y.S.2d 526 (Ist Dcp't 1955)
(per curiam).
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results while supposedly adhering to the O'Connell rule, if that rule is taken
to mean that all libel per quod requires an allegation of special damages.
If, on the other hand, the O'Connell rule of ordinary meaning is expressly
adopted,2 2 the case is actually much less rigid and absolute than has been
supposed by any of the courts which have heretofore considered it. With
one exception,2 3 all of the cases subsequent to O'Connell could be reconciled
on the ground that, while some courts have found the elements of innuendo
and inducement of value in determining the ordinary' meaning of the allegedly
defamatory publication, 24 other courts have found the ordinary meaning without them,2 5 their only purpose being to extend the meaning of the publication
without justification. On this ground, O'Connell might be criticized as being
so generic as to say nothing. It is submitted, however, that if the ordinary
meaning interpretation of O'Connell be accepted, the case has in reality established the most feasible guidepost possible for the determination of specific
controversies, 26 without the rigid, mechanistic, and too often unrealistic restrictions that would obtain from blind adherence to principles of libel per quod.
Courts may take notice of the fact that, while a statement may be perfectly
innocent on its face, it may be in reality a bitter and derogatory satire. Judges
should not be limited to the face of the publication in order to find the ordinary
meaning; if the ordinary meaning be defamation, albeit not on the face of the
publication, it should, in O'Connell's words,27 be actionable per se.
COROLLARIES OF THE "ORDINARY MEANING" RULE

The O'Connell case had merely said that where the ordinary meaning of
a publication is libelous, it should be actionable without special damages.
But where the ordinary meaning is not present or totally clear from the
face of the publication, there are several inferences which must necessarily
be drawn.
Inducement has been defined as extrinsic facts, not present on the face
22. In the latest decision of the court of appeals, Harwood Pharmacal Co. v. National
Broadcasting Co., 9 N.Y.2d 460, 174 N.E.2d 602, 214 N.Y.S.2d 725 (1961), the O'Connell
"ordinary meaning" definition of libel per se was cited. The court did not, however,
repudiate the dictum in O'Connell regarding libel by extrinsic fact, and consequently the
uncertainty of O'Connell remains.
23. The exception is apparent upon comparison of two cases: Smith v. Smith, 236
N.Y. 581, 142 N.E. 292 (1923) (memorandum decision) and Solotaire v. Cowles Magazines,
Inc., 107 N.Y.S.2d 798 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
24. E.g., Balabanoff v. Hearst Consol. Publications, Inc., 294 N.Y. 351, 62 N.E.2d 599
(1945).
25. E.g., Smith v. Staten Island Advance Co., 194 Misc. 299, 87 N.Y.S.2d 847 (Sup. Ct.
1949), aff'd mem., 276 App. Div. 978, 95 N.Y.S.2d 188 (2d Dep't 1950).
26. The "ordinary meaning" rule is one of interpretation; the rule that libel by extrinsic
fact or innuendo requires special damage is one of unseeing logic. The difficulty with tho
latter rule is that it is too often insensitive to the more subtle ways by which a defamation
may be accomplished.
27. 214 N.Y. at 358, 108 N.E. at 557.
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of the publication, whose allegation is essential to the defamatory sense of
the publication.2 3 Where such facts are necessary or even of value for the
total understanding of the language, or for establishing the ordinary meaning
of the words used, they do not render necessary an allegation of special
damages.P Innuendo is an allegation of the complaint which seeks to establish
what was said as capable of a defamatory meaning. ° If the innuendo is
warranted, i.e., if it seeks to do no more than to explain the application of the
words used, as O'Connell described its function, in order to show their
ordinary meaning or what a jury could reasonably find to be their ordinary
meaning, it is not repugnant to libel per se under the "ordinary meaning"
interpretation of O'Connell.31 Colloquium is an allegation of the pleading
which avers that the publication was made concerning the plaintiff, where,
upon the face of the publication, plaintiff is not identified.*2 It would seem
that, in view of Rule 96 of the Rules of Civil Practice,- 3 this element should
never be fatal to libel per se.34 In any event, if it merely gives fullness
to an understanding of the language, or aids in determining the ordinary
meaning, which could be cleverly concealed through the use of allegorical
or satirical devices, special damages should not be required to be pleaded.
In other words, the elements of libel per quod should not universally require
allegations of special damages, but only in those instances where the defamatory connotation which they seek to educe is outside the pale of possible
ordinary meaning because unreasonable. Several cases since O'Connell have
impliedly adopted such a position.
SUBSEQUENT CASE DEVELOPM1ENT

In Sydney v. McFadden Newspaper Publishing Corp.,3 5 the defendant
published a statement concerning the plaintiff which, when tahen with
the extrinsic fact of her marriage, imputed unchastity to her. The court
found a libel per se in spite of the extrinsic fact of plaintiff's marital status
contained in the complaint. The opinion stated: "this [publication] ... draws
with it all that Doris Keane is,l-her standing, her position in society, and
23. Cf. Prosser, Torts § 92, at SS2 (2d ed. 1955).
29. E.g., Balabanoff v. Hearst Consol. Publications Inc., 294 N.Y. 351, 62 N.E2d 599
(1945); de Figuerola v. AlcGravw-Hill Publishing Co., 19 'Mic. 840, 74 N.Y.S2d 443
(Sup. Ct. 1947), aff'd mem., 273 App. Div. S75, 73 N.Y.S.2d 197, appeal denied, 273 App.
Div. 957, 73 N.YS.2d 924 (1st Dep't 194S).
30. Cf. Prosser, Torts § 92, at 5S2 (2d ed. 1955).
31. Cf. Sullivan v. Daily lirror, Inc., 232 App. Div. 507, 250 N.Y. Supp. 420 (lst
Dep't 1931).
32. CL Prosser, Torts § 92, at 533 (2d ed. 1955).
33. Rule 96 provides: "In an action for libel or slander, it is not neccary to state
in the complaint any extrinsic fact for the purpose of shouing the application to the plaintiff of the defamatory matter, but the plaintiff may state in general terms that such matter
was published or spoken concerning him." N.Y.R. Civ. Prac. 96.
34. Sydney v. M1acFadden New-spaper Publishing Corp., 242 N.Y. 203, 151 N.E. 2G9
(1926).

35. Ibid.
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her relationship in life . ... 3a In other words, the publication on its face was
incomplete. Nevertheless, in the words of the O'Connell case, "the language as
a whole, considered in its ordinary meaning . . ." was injurious to the
plaintiff.3 7 The only reconciliation possible between the O'Connell definition
of a libel per se and the result reached in Sydney lies in the recognition
of the fact that in the latter case the language could not be considered
in its ordinary meaning absent the fact of plaintiff's marriage. The plaintiff,
8
the court reasoned, should not be isolated from her situation in life.3 This
realistic decision recognized that neither the printed word nor an ordinary
human being exists in an absolute vacuum. It went beyond the face of the
publication to find the ordinary meaning thereof, and found it to be libelous
by reason of the extrinsic fact of plaintiff's marriage.
Similarly, in the situation where a manufactured product is libeled in
such a way as to impute to the manufacturer dishonesty or fraud, the courts
have looked beyond the face of the publication in order to find the ordinary
meaning thereof and have found it to be libelous with the aid of the extrinsic
fact that the plaintiff was the manufacturer. In Harwood Pharmacal Co. v.
National Broadcasting Co.,39 plaintiff manufacturer was never mentioned
in the libelous publication. However, a product called "Snooze" was spoken
of by a television performer as fostering drug addiction, and was disparaged
in other terms which exceeded the bounds of fair comment. In this situation,
not merely the extrinsic fact that plaintiff was the manufacturer, but an
innuendo alleging that the meaning was that plaintiff was guilty of deceit
or dishonesty at the expense of the public, were required for the defamatory
sense of the publication. In citing O'Connell, the court found the publication
libelous per se. This result could not have been reached without the recognition
that O'Connell held merely that only those publications are libelous per se whose
ordinary meanings are libelous.40 To find the ordinary meaning, the court had
recourse to the extrinsic fact that plaintiff was the manufacturer and to the
innuendo that the publication could easily be understood in such a light as to
impute dishonesty to him.
Where the ordinary meaning is violated by the use of extrinsic fact or
innuendo, special damages should be required. Thus, in Ross v. MacFadden
Publications, Inc.,4 1 a publication that plaintiff had died without leaving
sufficient funds to provide for his children was held not to be libelous per se
where the extrinsic fact that plaintiff operated a business was adduced as
well as an innuendo that the publication imputed incompetence to him in his
business. Significantly, the court relied on the O'Connell dictum that extrinsic
36.
37.

Id. at 213, 151 N.E. at 210.
214 N.Y. at 358, 108 N.E. at 557.

38. This is implied in the broad dictum cited in the text accompanying note 35 supra.
39. 9 N.Y.2d 460, 174 N.E.2d 602, 214 N.Y.S.2d 725 (1961). See also Tex Smith, The
Harmonica Man, Inc. v. Godfrey, 198 Misc. 1006, 102 N.Y.S.2d 251 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
But see Marlin Fire Arms Co. v. Shields, 171 N.Y. 384, 64 N.E. 163 (1902).
40. The court cited O'Connell for the proposition that the ordinary meaning is determninative on the question of libel per se.
41. 174 Misc. 1019, 22 N.Y.S.2d 519 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
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facts require special damages. However, the same result could have been
reached had the court simply chosen to say that the ordinary meaning of the
statement did not extend as far as plaintiff alleged in his innuendo. Had
the court utilized the "ordinary meaning" rule, it would not have held the
extrinsic fact of plaintiff's business fatal, but rather the unwarranted innuendo,
which sought in this instance to "graft a meaning" when the ordinary meaning
was apparent.
Two further decisions will suffice as examples of situations whEre the
ordinar, meaning was found off the face of publications which were nevertheless held libelous per se. In Balabanoff v. Hcarst Consol.' Pubications
Inc., defendant published a statement alleging that plaintiff was a member of
the "dread Checka." The court held:
The allegations of the complaint describing the organization, functions and practices
of the "Checka" are essential to an understanding of the significance of the language
of the subject publication and do not, in our opinion, constitute extrinsic facts of
such a character as to necessitate allegations of special damage... :3
What extrinsic facts then, would necessitate allegations of special damage?
Obviously, those which would not be essential to an understanding of the
significance of the language. In de Figzerola v. McGraw-Hill Publishing Co.,"4
the name of an Axis agent was printed beneath a picture of the plaintiff.
The publication was held to be libelous per se in spite of the necessity of
the extrinsic fact that the name was that of an Axis spy. Like Sydney v.
MacFadden Newspaper Publishing Corp. and Harwood Pharmacal Co. v.
National Broadcasting Co., this is an example of a situation where the
ordinary meaning of the publication included facts not present on the face
of the article and where the ordinary meaning could not be arrived at
without reference to such facts.
Where no extrinsic facts were pleaded to establish a defamation, but
merely an innuendo, it was held in Sullivan v. Daily Mirror, Inc.;5 that
the innuendo did not require special damages. The court found the article
libelous per se because "the publications justify the innuendo pleaded."4 10
Obviously the publication could only justify the innuendo pleaded if the
innuendo did not do violence to the ordinary meaning of the publication.
"The test is whether to the mind of an intelligent man, the tenor of the
article and the language used naturally import a criminal or disgraceful
47
act."
There are several recent lower court decisions whose reasoning seems
to be in accord with the "ordinary meaning" interpretation of O'Connell
and with its implications. In Lasky v. Kempton," the court said:
42. 294 N.Y. 351, 62 N.E2d 599 (1945).
43. Id. at 355, 62 N.E2d at 601.
44. 89 Misc. 840, 74 N.Y.S.2d 443 (Sup. Ct. 1947), afd mem., 273 App. Div. 875,
7S N.YS.2d 197, appeal denied, 273 App. Div. 957, 73 N.YS.2d 924 (let Dep't 1943).
45. 232 App. Div. 507, 250 N.Y. Supp. 420 (lst Dep't 1931).
46. Id. at 510, 250 NY. Supp. at 423.
47. Ibid.

4S. 285 App. Div. 1121, 140 N.Y.S.2d 526 (1st Dep't 1955) (per curiam).

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

The article, written in a racy, hyperbolic style, is frequently cryptic in meaning...
only dubiously suggestive of matters defaming plaintiff. Its meaning not being
adequately clear, the necessity for a proper allegation of extrinsic fact or innuendo
is evident. . .49
In Harrison v. Winckell,50 it was said, as it had been long before in Sydney
v. McFadden Newspaper Publishing Corp., "Both [matrimonial status and
profession] are so-called extrinsic facts, but in my view neither is such
an 'extrinsic fact' as to require special damages to be pleaded. . .."51
Finally, in Larney v. Town & Village, Inc.52 the court, in holding a publication
libelous per se said, "It is permissible for plaintiff to show . ..a libelous
significance not discernible .. .by reason of what defendant had said .. .
in other articles. ....53
CONCLUSION

Although the rule in O'Connell that extrinsic facts require an allegation
of special damages has not been overruled, it is more often than not
disregarded. 54 If O'Connell is to have any significance at all, its meaning
should be expressed in terms of the holding-the rule of "ordinary meaning,"
basically a rule of interpretation of language. Obviously, the ordinary meaning
of a publication is most apparent by reference to the publication itself.
The further from the face of the publication the pleader must wander by
way of inducement or innuendo in order to establish the defamatory meaning
complained of, the more reluctant should the courts be to find the ordinary
meaning apart from the face of the publication. Neither inducement nor
innuendo should be controlling on the status of libel per se. What should
control is the ordinary meaning, be it on the face or off the face of the
publication. In the future, it is to be hoped that the court of appeals will
expressly ratify the view which it has impliedly adopted, by reaffirming
the O'Connell definition of libel per se in terms of ordinary meaning rather
than in terms of the absolutes of libel per quod: inducement, innuendo, and
colloquium. 55 The adoption by the New York courts of the ordinary meaning
49.

Ibid.

50. 207 Misc. 275, 137 N.Y.S.2d 82 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
51. Id. at 281, 137 N.Y.S.2d at 86.

52.

133 N.Y.L.J., Feb. 2, 1955, p. 7, col. 3 (unreported opinion of Sup. Ct., Walter, J.).

53.

Ibid.

54. Newman v. Ad Reinhardt, 133 N.Y.L.J., June 28, 1955, p. 3, cols. 6-7 (unreported
opinion of Sup. Ct., Nathan, J.), aff'd mem., 3 App. Div. 2d 909, 163 N.Y.S.2d 403 (1st
Dep't 1957).

55. The express adoption of the rule of "ordinary meaning," and the corresponding
abandonment by New York of the traditional formulae of libel per quod as controlling
would necessarily be a substantial departure from any present approach toward determining a libel per se. The trend of the most recent New York decisions has nonetheless been
to determine the existence of a libel per se by the application of this simple and sensible
rule of interpretation, and, to a large extent, to ignore the functional, iron-clad approach
of looking to inducement, innuendo, or colloquium as controlling.

